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I Monday
10th June 1667. sent
the “Dolphin”
fireship and two ketches to sink the Buoy of the Nore, so that it
should not be a help to the Dutch in their navigation. This command
was successfully carried out, though the Dutch had stationed a
man-of-war, a fireship, and a galliott by the buoy to prevent attempts
to sink it. The Dutch vessels offered no resistance to the English,
however, and when the latter approached the buoy the Dutch vessels
sailed away. In
another letter to the Navy Board Coventry declared: I
believe that at this time, which is no less than invasion, His Majesty
may by law use any man’s ships or goods for public defence, and any
resisting will be adjudged criminals; but I hope better temper will be
found. If men cannot otherwise be had to serve in the fireships they
must be tempted with profit and even ready money given….. The
Kent Militia had been called out on 9 June, and during the afternoon
of the following day a company of them arrived at Sheerness under the
command of Major Hugessen, Their quality was so poor, and their morale
so low, that Edward Gregory, in a letter to Pepys on 20 July 1667,
remarked diplomatically that upon the major’s courage and his
men’s resolution he would undertake to make no comment. The
general panic caused by the appearance of the Dutch in the Thames was
manifested in a deplorable way in Gravesend. Pepys related in his
diary on 10 June: Down
to Gravesend, where I find the Duke of Albemarle just come, with a
great many idle lords and gentlemen, with their pistols and fooleries,
and the bulworke not able to have stood half an hour had they [the
Dutch] come up, but the Dutch are fallen down from the Hope, and
Shell-haven as low as Sheernesse, and we do plainly at this time hear
the guns play……. I find the town had removed most of the goods out
of the town, for fear of the Dutch coming up to them; and from Sir
John Griffen [Sir John Griffith, Governor of Gravesend Fort] last
night there was not twelve men in the town to defend it. In
a letter to Sir William Coventry written at 1 a.m. on 11 June, Pepys
described how he sailed down the Thames to Gravesend, and he continued: “I
mett several vessells in my going downe, loaded with the Goods of the
people of Gravesend. Such was their fright……….. On
10 June, a few hours before Pepys letter was written, Peter Pett had
sent a message to the Navy Board is despairing terms as follows: Gen. There
is now appearing at ye Buoy of ye Norre upward of twenty sail of
Hollanders more, ye one of wch Seames to be a very great
Shipp, I feare they will git within Sheer Nasse this Eveing, there
being little to interrupt them, and doe believe ye whole Stress of ye
business will lie at ye Chain a lttle beyond Gillingham [where wee
have moared to interrupt them as much as wee can from comeing to ye
chain] [four great stages]. I wish wee had some of your number to
helpe advise and Act in these necessitus times, and yl you
come not too late…….. The
event which had prompted Pett to send this despairing letter was the
arrival off Sheerness of van Ghent’s squadron returning from its
unsuccessful foray up the Thames. The ships appeared off the Isle of
Sheppey about midday Monday 10 June and the Dutch at once decided to
amount an attack on Sheerness Fort, Captain Jan van Brakel in the “Vrede”
followed by two other men-of-war, was ordered to sail as close
to the fort as possible and engage it with cannon fire. The other
ships of the squadron were to follow, and under covering fire troops
were to be disembarked to attack the fort. The
opposition encountered by the Dutch was slight. Sir Edward Spragge had
been put in command of the ships lying in the Medway and the few small
vessels, including fireships and ketches which had been posted off
Sheerness. The only ship there that was capable of offering opposition
to the Dutch was the frigate “Unity”
which had been stationed off the fort to act as guardship. In
the late afternoon of Monday, about 5 p.m., van Ghent’s squadron,
taking advantage of an incoming tide, approached Sheerness Fort.
Captain van Brakel in the “Vrede”
was leading and found the “Unity”
frigate with some fireships and ketches lying in their path
off Garrison Point, near the uncompleted Sheerness Fort. In this
sixteen guns had been mounted but so very insecurely, that when they
were fired the recoil drove their carriages into the ground. Several
of the guns were made serviceable by placing loose planks under their
carriages to take the recoil, but the fire from these was insufficient
to deter van Brakel and his consorts. The
“Unity”
fired one broadside at the approaching Dutch, but then, when a blazing
Dutch fireship bore down on her, she beat a retreat up the Medway,
followed by her own fireships and ketches. Meanwhile
the Dutch ships continued to fire on Sheerness Fort, and soon one of
the men servicing the guns, was killed, and another had a leg and
thigh shot off. The injured man was carried off screaming out loud for
a surgeon; and then a rumour spread that no surgeon was available,
Thereby all but seven of the men serving the guns deserted their posts,
and shortly after the faithful seven, including Sir Gregory, were also
forced to abandon the unequal contest, especially since they learnt
that a considerable force of Dutch troops had been put ashore about a
mile away. Gregory
and his companions were taken on board Sir Edward Spragge’s yacht
“Henrietta”
and a discussion took place about what could best be done to
hinder the troops the Dutch had put ashore. Captain Annesly, one of
the gallant seven, was instructed to see whether steps could be taken
to flood the marshes in order to obstruct the Dutch if they should try
to make for Queensferry and cross from Sheppey to the mainland. As a
further precaution Captain Douglas with his company of Scots troops
was ordered to station himself at the ferry and remain there till
further notice to guard it. Spragge
also sent Gregory off in pursuit of the “Unity”
and her accompanying vessels with orders to to remain at the
Mussel Bank, just before the narrow band where the Medway turns South
into Gillingham Reach. Gregory afterwards returned to the “Henrietta”
and remained in it with Sir Edward Spragge, watching
helplessly while the Dutch continued their cannonade. They did not
stop firing till about 9 in the evening, and then, Sheerness having
been lost, Spragge sailed up the Medway in the “Henrietta” for Chatham. Long
before this the Dutch had captured and abandoned Sheerness Fort. Some
800 men had been landed under command of Colonel Dolman, but a small
party of seamen under Cornelis Gerrits Vos, Captain of the yacht the
“Jonge
Prins” were the first to enter the fort. Disembarking from
their longboat they pulled down the English Flag and hoisted the Dutch
Flag in its place. Cornelis Gerrits Vos later received from the
Admirality of the Maas 100 ducats as a reward for the enterprise he
had shown. In
addition to the guns in the fort, the Dutch found at Sheerness
valuable stores, such as sawn timber, masts, spars, quantities of iron
and brass, and barrels of gunpowder, resin and tar. They estimated
their value as equivalent to four or five tons of gold (equivalent
to 400.000 -- 500.000 guldens); but later English appraisals
calculated their worth, including that of the storehouse buildings, at
some ₤ 3.000. After
the action on Monday 10 June had ended Cornelis de Wit sat down in his
cabin on board the “Agatha” and wrote a letter to the States-General, giving an
account of what had happened since his letter on 7 June. After telling
of the capture of Sheerness Fort, he stated that the guns, and as much
of the stores as could conveniently be carried in the ships of van
Ghent’s squadron had been taken aboard and that he had given orders
that what remained on shore should be burned or otherwise destroyed.
Cornelis ended his letter triumphantly: “From
the “Agatha” lying at the angle of the river of Chatham before
Sheerness Fort, 20 June [10 June in the Old Style, Julian Calendar;
the Dutch had already adopted the new Gregorian calender] late
in the evening. Some
hours later, Peter Pett was writing another letter, this time in quite
a different vein. Late at night on Monday 10 June he wrote to the
members of the Navy Board, from Chatham, as follows: I
am sorry that I can give you noe better newes than to let you know
that after 2 or 3 hours dispute wth Dutch by Sr Edward
Sprage Sherenesse is lost. Wee have resolvd the sinkeing of two small
fireships in the midst of long reach tomorrow morning the removeing of
wch againe I apprehend will be noe greate difficultie. Wee
shall doe whatever wee call in servicing the Navy, and doe wish wee
had some of your assistence in soe great a concerne to his Matie and
the Kingdom. The
implied reproach to the members of the Navy Board revealed that
Commissioner Pett was understandably apprehensive of what the Dutch
might do next. His fears were justified, for the events of the next
few days were to involve him much more closely and directly than the
action at Sheerness had done. A situation was in fact developing which
proved to be a national disaster. After
he gave the alarm on 6 June to the personnel of the dockyard and the
ships in the Medway, Peter Pett does not seem to have taken any
positive steps to meet a possible emergency, until Sunday 9 June. Even
then he had to be spurred on by the orders of Sir Edward Spragge,
brought to him on Sunday evening by Edward Gregory. On receipt of
Spragge’s orders Pett began to issue instructions to the boatswains
of ships in the Medway and to shipwrights in the dockyard. These were
ordered to take charge of the pinnaces and long-boats which had been
assembled in accordance with the Duke of York’s instructions of 25
March. These small vessels were necessary for such vital tasks as
towing ships and transporting soldiers, seamen, provisions, stores,
and ammunition from place to place. Pett was able to provide a crew (usually
numbering from twelve to fifteen men) for each of the boats commanded
by a shipwright; but boats belonging to the men-of-war in the river,
each in charge of the boatswain of a ship, had no crews provided, and
the boatswains were left to collect what men they could find. Eleven
boats were provided for the shipwrights, and about 150 men were
employed as crews for these. Another nineteen boats, most of which
were commanded by boatswains, had scratch crews of seamen, usually
very few in number, and no record remains of the total number of men
employed in these boats. George Moore, boatswain of the “Triumph”
managed to get together thirteen men to man his boat, and the
“Vanguard”
provided ten for hers, but most of the other boats were
insufficiently manned. The boatswain of the “Helversome”
for example, could find only one man to serve; and the
boatswain of the “Rainbow”
only two, because the men on board the men-of-war had been
ordered to perform other duties. One
of the shipwrights, Thomas Dry, who had been told to take command of a
boat, discovered that no boat had been provided for him. Using his own
initiative, however, he found a small craft, normally used for
transporting pitch and tar, and he managed to get some pressed men,
who were strangers to him, as a crew. Another shipwright, E Perkins,
was given a crew, but found out that no boat had been provided for him,
so he and his men remained in the dockyard, no doubt not unwillingly.
In not a single case did the crew of a boat whether commanded by a
shipwright or a boatswain, receive arms. They asked for these, but the
reply given was none were available. On
Sunday night, some of the boats were employed by Peter Pett to take
soldiers from the “Monmouth”
aboard two hoys which were to take the men to Sheerness, on
Sir Edward Spragge’s orders, other boats and pinnaces, also in
accordance with Spragge’s orders, were directed to tow the “Monmouth”
to a position just above the chain at Gillingham; and others
again were sent to bring powder and shot from Upnor Castle to the
dockyard. In
his two letters of 10 June to the Navy Board, Pett lamented the
absence of senior officials of the Navy, whose help and advice he
needed. Soon, however, as the crisis developed, two members of the
Navy Board, Sir John Mennes and Lord Brouncker, made their way to
Chatham, and early in the morning of Tuesday 11 June, The Duke of
Albemarle himself arrived. Under him in positions of authority were,
in addition to Mennes and Brouckner, Lord Middleton, Sir Edward
Spragge, Lord Douglas, Peter Pett, and the two Masters of Attendances
in Chatham Dockyard. Captains John Brooke and William Rand. This
proved to be a superfluity of leadership, for as the emergency
developed these officials tended to give orders independently of each
other. Thus instructions given by one were sometimes countermanded by
another, or two sets of conflicting instructions were given. This led
to confusion, not to say chaos, and had a bad effect on the already
weak morale of the seamen and the dockyard-men. On
Monday 10 June some of the pinnaces and longboats were employed under
Pett’s direction in transporting soldiers of Lord Douglas’s
regiment from the dockyard to Upnor Castle and Gillingham. >From the
latter place they were sent aboard the two guardships lying near the
chain, the “Charles
V” and the “Matthias”
Soldiers were also put aboard the “Royal
Charles” and the “Royal
James” lying
nearby in Gillingham Reac h. Other boats were directed to the chain,
where their crews helped to raise it so that a new stage could be put
under it. One of the shipwrights, Richard Penney, was ordered by Pett
to take his boat lower down the Medway in the direction of Sheerness,
to try to find out what was happening there. Sheerness Fort had,
however, already been taken by the Dutch, and the same evening Sir
Edward Spragge, appearing off Gillingham in the “Henrietta”
yacht, was able to give full details of the melancholy event. Spragge
joined Lord Middleton on board the “Monmouth”
and discussions at once took place about what should be done
to counter a further advance of the Dutch, since it was to be expected
that they would without delay make an attempt to destroy the ships and
dockyards at Chatham. It was suggested therefore that fireships should
be sunk near Musselbank, just below the bend in the Medway, where the
river turns south between Hoo and Darnett points to enter Gillingham
Reach. Spragge was doubtful whether sinking fireships at the
Musselbank would be
effective, since in his opinion, not enough vessels were available to
block completely the two navigable channels near the Musselbank. Despite
Spragge’s doubts, the project was pursued, after Albemarle had
sanctioned it. This he did because Peter Pett had assured him that in
his opinion, and that of the two Masters of Attendance, three vessels
sunk at the Musselbank would be sufficient to stop the advance of the
Dutch, Captain Rand, one of the Masters of Attendance, had been
ordered early on Tuesday morning to take the “Royal
Charles” higher up the river with the help of a pilot, Some
shipwrights, with their boats and crews, were allotted to him to carry
out the operation, which, from evidence given later by Richard Penney,
one of the shipwrights, was ordered by Peter Pett, ‘ Rand was,
however, subsequently ordered to leave the “Royal
Chartles” and to supervise instead the sinking of three
small vessels, previously intended for use as fireships, at the Mussel
Bank. These vessels were the “Constant John” the “Unicorn”
and the “John and Sarah”, and Rand successfully carried out this task
during the morning of Tuesday 11 June. Edward
Gregory, Clerk of the Check at Chatham, witnessed the sinking of the
three ships and he later described this as: “an
unadvised piece of worke” Shortly after leaving the Mussel Bank,
he met Lord Brouckner and Peter Pett who were on their way there, and
at their request Gregory went down to the Mussel Bank again with them.
He expressed his doubts about the effectiveness of sinking ships there
but these carried no weight with Pett and Brouckner although they
decided to make sure the blockage was complete more ships should be
sunk. Two
more fireships, (the “Barbados Merchant” and the “Dolphin” , two ketches,
(the
“Edward and Eve” and the “Hind”),
and the “Fortune” a dogger,
(a small two-masted fishing boat) were accordingly also sunk at the
Mussel Bank, but the work was done in haste, since men and boats were
wanted for many other urgent tasks that day. One
of the most important of these was to remove the men-of-war lying in
Gillingham Reach, higher up the river. Chief among these were the “Royal Charles” and
the”Royal
James”, and during the morning on Tuesday 11 June the latter
was taken to a new position just above Upnor Castle. The ”Royal Charles”, however,
which should also have been moved, remained at her moorings. This was
because the boats and crews that Peter Pett needed to move her, were
sent on other tasks, including the sinking of the ships at the Mussel
Bank. It seems that these boats and crews, nominated by Pett to move
the “Royal Charles” were
taken from that task and commanded elsewhere by the Duke of Albemarle
himself. In a report he made subsequently to the House of Commons, he
recounted: He
[i.e. Peter Pett]
came and told me that he would carry her [i.e.
the “Royal
Charles”]
up that tide, if he might have boats, which I could not then
spare; for if they were gone all aour batteries must have been
neglected, and I could not transport the timber, powder shot and men,
to them to resist the enemies the next day. And besides, it was
thought advisable, at that instant, if the Dutch should have landed in
the marsh by the crane, she [i.e.
the “Royal
Charles” ] might
have been useful and have hindered them having guns aboard.
Nevertheless, upon notice shortly after that there was neither sponge,
ladle powder or shot in her. I sent Captain Millett, commander of the
“Matthias” about ten in
the morning with orders to Commissioner Pett to carry her up as high
as he could, the next tide. Who pretended he could not then do it,
because there was but one pilot that would undertake it, and he was
employed about sinking ships. And seeing she was not removed in the
morning, I myself spake to him, the said Commissioner Pett, in the
evening in the presence of Colonel MacNaughton and Captain Mansfield,
to fetch her off that tide. But notwithstanding these orders the ship
was not removed.
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