|
Wednesday
12th June 1667.
On
Wednesday morning, 12 June, in accordance with their decision to
abandon Sheerness Fort, the Dutch removed the guns, and these were
transferred to the ships of van Ghent’s squadron. Stores, which it
was thought worth while to keep were also taken aboard, and the rest
were destroyed. Lastly, the fort itself was demolished as completely
as was possible within the short time available. The Dutch also
expertly destroyed embankments near Sheerness in order to cause
inundation and Lord Brouncker wrote to the Navy Board later, on 22
June, saying that, if the banks were not speedily repaired before the
next spring tide, much land would be flooded.
Tobiasz and his advance force freed a passage for the rest of van
Ghent’s squadron, which left Sheerness about 6 a.m. on Wednesday 12
June, favoured by an east-north-east wind and an incoming tide. When
they arrived in Gillingham Reach they found that Tobiasz and his
advance force were held up by the chain and by fire from the
guardships and batteries.
The entire Dutch force was in formation of line astern, partly for
tactical reasons, partly because the increasing narrowness made any
other alignment difficult and hazardous. In front were the three
frigates of the advance guard, with Tobiasz in the “Bescherming” at the head.
Then
came the yachts, followed by two fireships, the “Susanna” and “ Pro
Patria”; and they in turn were followed by other fireships
and the remaining men-of-war of van Ghent’s squadron. The entire
Dutch force, spread out as it was, stretched from a position near the
chain to the Mussel Bank, and must have made an impressive sight,
especially when the main body approached Gillingham Reach at about 10
a.m.
Because of the narrowness of the fairway, which prevented the Dutch
from massing line abreast, there ships were unable to bring a
sufficient volume of fire to bear to silence the opposition at the
chain , and because of the chain itself they were deterred from
sailing on. At this critical juncture, when the enterprise seemed
destined to fail, the situation was saved for the Dutch by the bravery
of one man. This was Captain Jan van Brakel, of the “Vrede”
 |
Jan van Brakel (??? --
1690) |
{Forty
guns complement 125 men). He was from Rotterdam and had already given
proof of his courage and his enterprise in the Four Day’s Battle in
1666, and, lately, during the assault on Sheerness. After this recent
exploit, however, he had been put under close arrest in the “Agatha”
by order of Cornelis de Witt for having allowed his men to
land on the Isle of Sheppey and forage into the interior in search of
plunder.
Hearing of the opposition which had been encountered in
Gillingham Reach, van Brakel saw a change of ending his irksome
captivity in the “Agatha”.
He
offered to sail up to the chain in his own ship, the “Vrede” and while thus
drawing the English fire, enabled two fireships to be sent against the
chain. Cornelis de Witt, in despair, accepted van Brakel’s offer,
since there appeared to be no alternative but a retreat; and so van
Brakel was released from arrest and returned to the “Vrede”
which was lying in the rear of the Dutch squadron.
He then carried out an exploit which, both for its daring and
its momentous consequences. ranks as one of the most remarkable in the
annals of naval warfare. He quickly got the “Vrede”
under way, and sailed past the leading Dutch ships, followed
by two fireships, until approaching the chain he came under heavy fir
from the English guardships and batteries. He sailed on, however, and
soon there was nothing between him and the chain but the “Unity”,
with forty-four guns. and some 150 men on board.
Holding his own fire van Brakel sailed straight for the “Unity” lying near the
shore at the Gillingham end of the chain, and when he was near he
fired at her, then came quickly alongside, boarded, and captured her.
The opposition from the English ship had been negligible, and this was
not surprising in view of the nature of her crew. A number of
Thames’ watermen who had been brought down from London had been sent
aboard the “Unity”
to complete her complement, but they proved useless. A watch
had to be set to prevent them from deserting, and when the Dutch
approached they were the first to abandon ship. Some of the crew who
did not manage to escape, were taken prisoner, and among these was
John Stanley, the ship’s surgeon, who three month later after his
return from Dutch captivity, sent in a claim for ₤ 32, which he
said represented the value of equipment which he had lost when the “Unity”
was captured.
The only casualties suffered by the “Vrede”
were three men wounded of whom two later died; and the lack of
fighting spirit aboard the Ünity”
which this reveals can also be gauged from the fact that
earlier in the day Stephen Woolgate, boatswain of the “Great
Victory” had been ordered by Sir Edward Spragge to lie
alongside the “Unity”
with his long-boat to prevent any of the men aboard her from
trying to escape ashore. Woolgate obediently acted as watchdog until
he saw de “Vrede” approaching,
whereupon he took his boat up an adjacent creek and so avoided capture
by the Dutch. For Woolgate the day had been more than usually eventful
largely because of the way he was shuttled about as a result of
conflicting orders. Early in the day he had been told by Lord
Brouckner and Commissioner Pett to go aboard the “Royal
Charles”, but was intercepted by Sir Edward Spragge, who
told him instead to go and look for seamen ashore, and bring back as
many as he could find as quickly as possible. Woolgate returned saying
he had been unable to find any men, and Spragge then asked him what
his original orders had been. Woolgate replied that he had been
detailed by Brouckner and Pett to go aboard the “Royal
Charles” and stay there till further notice. Despite this,
Spragge ordered Woolgate to take one of the boats of the “Royal Charles”, man it
with some of the crew and then report to Albemarle for further
instructions. Woolgate did this, and after he had carried out a task
allotted to him by the Duke, he reported back to Spragge, and it was
then that he was told to station his boat alongside the “Unity”
Woolgate was one of several boatswains and shipwrights who
received orders from one officer only to have them cancelled by
another, and this lack of cohesion on the English side, resulting from
too many persons giving orders without reference to one another,
undoubtedly hampered the preparation of countermeasures against the
Dutch.
Meanwhile, as van Brakel was engaging the “Unity”
the first of two fireships which had followed the “Vrede”
and which was called the “Susanna”,
sailed up to the chain but failed to break it, and soon
afterwards caught fire. The second fireship, the “Pro
Patria” followed close behind the “Susanna”
rode hard at the chain, and broke it. She then positioned
herself alongside the “Matthias” lying just above the chain near the Gillingham shore,
and set her afire. She burned furiously for a while, and then, with a
huge detonation, blew up, Some of her crew, including the surgeon, was
badly burned, but rescued from the water by the boatswain in charge of
the long-boat of the “Triumph”
who was sent by Sir Edward Spragge to pick up survivors.
A third Dutch fireship, the “Delft”,
which attempted to attempted to place herself alongside the
other guardship by the chain, the “Charles
V”, on the Hood side of the river, was sunk by cannon-fire
from that ship, but meanwhile another fireship managed to get herself
alongside the “Charles
V” and set her on fire.
Shortly afterwards van Brakel left the “Unity”
in a boat manned by a few Dutch sailors, and made for the
burning “Charles
V, The crew of this vessel were now so demoralized that
some of them escaped in boats in seeing the Dutch approach, while
other in their panic jumped overboard and began swimming ashore. Those
remaining on board surrendered without putting up any opposition when
they saw van Brakel climbing up over the bows with his sword drawn,
followed by his men, climbing over the bulwarks. After the English had
handed over their weapons to the Dutch van Brakel ordered a trumpeter
to go aloft and haul down the English flag, and this final
humiliations appeared to have been too much for the captain of the “Charles
V” who had surrendered with the remnant of his crew. He
despairingly tried to escape by diving over board, but was picked up
and brought back on board. The exact number of men taken prisoner
aboard the “Charles V” is not known,
but according to Dutch sources the total of prisoners from the “Charles
V” and the “Unity” was fifty-six.
The
fire on the “Charles V” took such a
hold that the Dutch were unable to put it out, and the ship, after
burning for the rest of the day, finally blew up. Before this occurred
it seems very probable that she had drifted up the river. In 1876,
when new basis were being constructed during extensions to Chatham
dockyard, the remains of an old men-of-war were found at the East end
of St Mary’s Creek, with her guns embedded in the mud around her.
This wreck may have been either the “Sancta
Maria” or the “Charles
V” in a survey of the Medway made on 10 and 11 October 1667
both these ships were reported as lying sunk on the South-east side of
Cockham Wood Reach.
After
the “Unity”
the chain broken, ands the “Matthias”
and “Charles V” were set on fire, the “Monmouth” lying above
the chain had judged it prudent to withdraw higher up the river, she
managed to effect this rather inglorious retreat, though she had to be
towed by longboats around the bend of the Medway into Upnor Reach,
where she was finally brought to a halt by grounding just above the
castle. After some desperate efforts she was got off again, and taken
still higher up the river to a position opposite the Old Dockyard.
Though the “Monmouth” had escaped, a
much more tempting prize lay still in the river a little above the “Monmouth’s”
original position. This was the “Royal
Charles”, half rigged, and with only thirty-two of her guns
still on board. Sir Edward Spragge, foreseeing that the Dutch would
try to take her, had ordered the crews of several pinnaces and
long-boats to go aboard her as reinforcement. and he issued his order
“on pain of death”, as
was afterwards recorded. Some of the boat’s crew were able to escape
the unpopular assignment by towing the “Monmouth” into Upnor Reach, the others, who unwillingly
boarded the “Royal
Charles” left her promptly soon afterwards when they saw the
Dutch drawing near. As they had few if any arms, these men could
hardly be blamed for their dereliction of duty, and in fact,
Spragge’s threat of death for any who refused to go on board and
fight does not appear to have been carried out.
The is a story, recounted by Clarendon, that at about this time, when
the Dutch broke through the chain, the Duke of Albemarle planned to
make a heroic last stand in one of the vessels lying above the chain (perhaps
the “Monmouth” or the “Royal
Charles” itself) but was dissuaded from doing so.
Clarendon’s
account was as follows.:
The
General [Albemarle] was of a constitution and temper so void of fear,
that
there could appear no signs of distraction in him, yet it was plain
enough, that he
knew not what orders to give. There were two or three ships of the
Royal Navy
negligently, if not treacherously, left in the river which might have
been very easily
drawn into safety, and could be of no imaginable use in the place
where they were.
Into one of those the General put himself, and invited the young
gentlemen who were
volunteers, to accompany him, which they readily did in great numbers,
only with
pikes in their hands. But some of his friends whispered to him how
unadvised that
resolution was, and how desperate, without the possibility of success,
the whole fleet
of
the enemy approaching as the incoming tide would enable them. And so
he was
prevailed with to put himself again on shore, which except he had done,
both himself
and
two or three hundred gentlemen of the nobility and prime gentry of the
Kingdom
had
inevitably perished
During
the action at the chain, Lord Brouncker, Sir John Mennes, and Peter
Pett assembled as many long-boats and pinnaces as could be gathered
together, and stationed them so, that they might at least be able to
rescue men from the water. As for the three officials themselves, they
watched events from a small barge positioned at a safe distance from
the conflict. The sight which they must have seen has been described
by a historian of the Royal Navy, in words, though picturesque,
probably give a fairly accurate picture of what took place.
The
scene
at that moment to be witnessed
below Chatham, has not often been
paralleled in naval history…..
The river was full of moving craft and burning
wreckage; the roar of guns was
almost continuous; the shrieks of the wounded
could be heard even above
the noise of battle, the clangor of trumpets, the roll
of
drums, and the cheers of the
Dutch as success after success was won;
and
above all
hang a pall of smoke, illumined only, as night closed in, by the
gleam of
flames on all sides and the
flashes of guns and muskets.
The
culmination of this action at Gillingham Reach, and the crowning
success for the Dutch, was the capture of the “Royal
Charles” yet this was accomplished without any drama because
of the failure of the men aboard to put up any fight. The only dispute,
in fact, after the ship had been taken, was between the Dutch
themselves, as to who had actually captured the ship. From all the
available evidence it appears that Captain Thomas Tobiasz was the
first aboard the “Royal Charles”, followed
by a few men from his sloop, and, shortly afterwards, by others from a
sloop under command of Lieutenant B. Jacob’s, one of the officers of
Vice-Admiral de Liefde.
Pepys
related in his diary on 22 June 1667 that a Captain Hart and a Captain
Hayward had told him that the Dutch took the “Royal
Charles” “with a boat of about nine men and found not a man aboard her…… and
presently a man went up and struck the flag and
jacke, and a trumpeter sounded upon her “Joan’s placket is
torn””
Among the men who had deserted the “Royal
Charles” were the boatswain and gunner; they tried
afterwards to justify their conduct by affirming that seeing that all
was lost, they had tried twice, unsuccessfully, to set the ship on
fire before the Dutch reached her. In his report to the House of
Commons Albemarle later commented unfavourably on the two men,
accusing them of failure to “do their duties in firing her”
Beyond
the “Royal Charles”, in
Cockham Wood Reach, lay the grounded “Sancta
Maria”, and she proved to be the final objective of the
Dutch on Wednesday 12 June. The crew of a sloop, commanded by Captain
Jacob Philipsz, of the armed yacht “De Brak” sailed up river
and boarded her, but afterwards, in circumstances which were never
cleared up, she was set on fire and destroyed by the Dutch themselves.
It seems that they did this after all efforts to get the vessel afloat
again had failed, but that the decision was taken without reference to
Cornelis de Witt.
Long before the capture of the “Sancta
Maria” the Dutch had dealt with the two improvised batteries
which Albemarle had had constructed at each end of the chain.
Concentrated fire was brought to bear on these, and the garrisons,
overwhelmed by the sudden onslaught, abandoned their posts and fled.
Since the chain had already been broken and the guardships silenced,
the way was now clear for the rear ships of van Ghent’s squadron to
advance further up Gillingham Reach, this they did, led by the “Agatha”, with Cornelis de Witt and van Ghent on board. For a
time they transferred to the “Vrede”,
to confer with, and to congratulate van Brakel, and then they moved on
to the captured “Royal
Charles”, to discuss on board her what the next phase in the
operations should be.
During the attack in Gillingham Reach on Wednesday 12 June, when
it seemed very probable that the Dutch would continue their advance
without delay against Chatham Dockyard, and the ships lying higher up
the river, Albemarle had ordered that all those ships should be sunk
at their moorings forthwith. On consideration, however, it was decided
that this measure would be too drastic, and instead an order was given
that the ships’ cables should be cut, and then that they should then
be maneuvered to the shore into shallow water and there sunk, so that
the Dutch would be unable to remove them should they reach so far.
Lord Brouckner, Sir John Mennes and Peter Pett, supervised the
execution of this order, and as a result some sixteen men-of-war were
cut loose. A few of these subsequently drifted in the river, and thus
hindered defence measures against the Dutch, but others were sunk as
ordered, for example the “Katherine”
just below the New Dockyard, and the “St George” opposite the ropeyard, and the “Victory” opposite St
Mary’s Church.
The “Royal
James” and other men-of-war which had been moved higher up
the river near Upnor, were the obvious targets for a fresh attack; but
the tide had ebbed, and it was not possible for the Dutch to follow up
their great successes of the Wednesday immediately.
They
resolved, however, to attack the ships at Upnor, as soon as possible
the next morning, Thursday 13 June; Cornelis de Witt sent an urgent
message to de Ruyter, who was waiting off the Isle of Sheppey, with
the main body of the fleet, asking him to sent more fireships and to
come in person up the Medway to confer about the further attack which
it was proposed to make.
The industrious Cornelis, remote from all the celebrations that
were taking place in the Dutch ships in Gillingham Reach, sat down in
the admiral’s cabin at the “Royal
Charles” and wrote to the States-General a detailed account
of recent operations. He piously thanked God Almighty, Who, in His
providence, had deigned to humble the pride of the English nation by
means of the glorious arms of their High Mightinesses the
States-General. Cornelis further wished their High Mightinesses much
good fortune from the magnificent victory which had been won, and with
pardonable pride he dated his letter at the fool of the last sheet, as
follows: “In the “Royal Charles”, the
22 June [ i.e. 12 June Old Style] 1667, about two in the afternoon,
lying in the river of Chatham”
At
10 a.m. on Wednesday 12 June, when the leading vessels of van
Ghent’s squadron were entering Gillingham Reach, the Duke of
Albemarle watched from the shore, and he witnessed with a bitterness
easily imagined, the subsequent debacle when the Dutch took the “Unity”,
broke trough the chain, set the “Matthias”
and the “Charles
V” on fire, and captured the “Royal
Charles” and “Sancta
Maria”. After chronicling this melancholy succession of
disasters in his report, which he made afterwards to the House of
Commons, Albemarle observed abruptly, “This
was all that I observed of the enemy’s action on Wednesday”
Indeed,
he had had too much to do to spend further time in mere observation of
the Dutch after they had been brought to a temporary halt by the ebb
of the tide on Wednesday. It would be considered a certainty that,
spurred on by their successes, they would, as soon as the tide turned,
attempt to do further damage higher up the river, where other ships,
including the “Royal Oak” “Loyal London” and “Royal James” lay, above
Upnor Castle. There was also Chatham Dockyard with its storehouses and
other installations, to tempt the Dutch on.
After the disasters on Gillingham Reach on Wednesday, Albemarle
concentrated his energies on providing for the defence of the ships
lying further up the Medway and the Dockyard itself. First he inquired
of Sir Edward Scott, whom he had put in charge of Upnor Castle,
whether it was in a state of preparedness. He received in reply a
request for provisions which Scott said he needed urgently, and sent
as much as could be carried by the boats and crews still available for
transport duties. He also took the precaution of sending an additional
company of soldiers to reinforce the garrison, in case the Dutch
should try to repeat their exploit at Sheerness by landing and
attempting to take the castle by force. As for the three men-of-war,
lying just above the castle, Albemarle had decided very early on
Wednesday morning, that they should be moved to the Upnor bank of the
Medway till they grounded in the shallow water. He then ordered that
holes should be cut in their hulls so that it would be impossible for
the Dutch, should they reach the ships, to move them.
The
work of thus immobilizing the “Royal
Oak”, “Royal James” and “Loyal
London” had been carried out successfully before the Dutch
ceased their operations on Wednesday.
Albemarle’s main care, however, was to try to provide some
defences for the dockyard, and the other two, the New Dockyard further
down the river towards St Mary’s Island. The ten large guns,
comprising the train of artillery which had just arrived from the
Tower of London by way of Gravesend were mounted in a field by the
North Crane in the New Dockyard, and about fifty other guns were
placed in various positions whence they could bring fire to bear on
ships attempting to sail up the river.
Many
of these guns, including eight that came from the “Old James”, were hastily removed from ships lying higher up
the Medway between Rochester Bridge and the dockyard, the eight from
the “Old
James” were probably those installed in one or other of the
former sconces (“Bay” and “Warham)
which lay just below Upnor Castle.
Albemarle spent the whole of Wednesday night making those
dispositions, and it was a dispiriting experience, for he wrote later
in his report.:
I
stayed all night on the place by the men; and having no money to pay
them, all I
could do or say was little enough for their encouragement, for I had
no assistance
from Commissioner Pett nor no gunners or men, to draw on the guns,
except the two
Masters of Attendance.
Meanwhile
the Dutch plans were going forward, in response to the letter written
by Cornelis de Witt, Admiral de Ruyter had left the main body of the
Dutch fleet lying off the Isle of Sheppey and had sailed up the Medway
to Gillingham Reach, accompanied by Admiral van Aylua, who had joined
the fleet with the Friesland squadron on 11 June, and by Admiral Aert
Jan van Nes. He arrived in the late afternoon of Wednesday 12 June,
after the action of the day had ended, and one of the first duties he
set himself was to on board the captured “Unity”
to congratulate van Brakel on his courage and initiative. Afterwards
de Ruyter conferred with Cornelis de Witt and van Ghent about the
attack on the ships lying above Upnor Castle which was planned for the
next day.
It was decided that four men-of-0war, and three armed yachts
should sail up to Upnor Castle, and engage it with their guns, and
that under this cover five fireships following them should place
themselves alongside the “Royal Oak” “Royal James” and “Loyal London” and set
them afire. The commanders of the men-of-war, were expressly ordered
not to venture higher up the river than Upnor, lest they should not be
able to withdraw again because of the narrowness of the river there.
Early on Wednesday evening, van Aylua and van Nes sailed back
down the Medway to Sheerness, with orders to send without delay all
remaining fireships; but de Ruyter, who decided to take part in the
forthcoming operation, slept during the night on board the “Bescherming”,
commanded by Captain Thomas Tobiasz, the conqueror of the “Royal
Charles”. Early on Thursday morning five additional
fireships which had been sent at the request of Cornelis de Witt
arrived in Gillingham Reach, so that the Dutch were now in a position
to begin their attack on the ships at Upnor.
BACK
to 11 June
FORWARD
to 13 June.
Terug
naar de vorige pagina
|