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THE
FOUR DAYS BATTLE 11 - 14 JUNE 1666.
Dutch version: Vierdaagse
Zeeslag.
Source: Wikipedia,
In
June 1665
the British had soundly defeated the Dutch in the Battle
of Lowestoft,
but failed to take advantage of it. The Dutch Spice Fleet loaded
with fabulous riches, managed to return home safely. The Dutch navy
was enormously expanded through the largest building programme in its
history. In August 1665 already the British fleet was again challenged,
though no large battles resulted. In 1666 the British became anxious
to destroy the Dutch navy completely before it could grow too strong
and were desperate to end the activity of Dutch raiders as a collapse
of British trade threatened.
On
learning that the French fleet intended to join the Dutch at Dunkirk,
the English decided to prevent this by splitting their fleet. Their
main force would try to destroy the Dutch fleet first, while a
squadron under Prince
Rupert was sent to block the Strait of Dover against the French - who didn't
show up.
The
English fleet of about 56 ships commanded by George Monck, 1st
Duke of Albemarle who also commanded the red squadron, was
outnumbered by the Dutch fleet of 85 commanded by
Lieutenant-Admiral Michiel de Ruyter. The battle ended with a
successful English disengagement after their fleet had expended most
of its ammunition.
The
Dutch inflicted significant damage on the English fleet. The English
had gambled that the crews of the many new Dutch ships of the line
would not have been fully trained yet but were deceived in their hopes:
They had not counted with the unrelentless training schedule that de
Ruyter had submitted his entire fleet to. Captains and lowly crewmen
alike had to fight mock battles till they almost dropped. The Dutch
guncrews could fire almost two shota against the British only one,
thus de Ruyter doubled his already superior numbers. The British they
lost almost ikmmediately ten ships, 4,500 men and two admirals, Sir Christopher Myngs and Sir William Berkeley. HMS “Sovereign of the Seas” was
knocked out of the battle after she lost so many sailors that she
could no longer move or fire her cannon.
First Day
On
the first day Monck, sailing in the van with George
Ayscue's white squadron behind him and Thomas Allin's blue squadron forming the rear,
surprised the Dutch fleet at anchor near Dunkirk.
He attacked the Dutch rear under Lieutenant-Admiral Cornelis
Tromp
and sent a message to Rupert to join him if possible. When Tromp
fled over the Flemish shoals, Monck wore to the northwest, to meet the
Dutch centre (under De Ruyter) and van (commanded by
Lieutenant-Admiral Cornelis
Evertsen).
Tromp again turned, but his ship “Liefde” collided with “Groot
Hollandia”. Vice-Admiral Berkeley saw this and closed in with HMS
“Swiftsure”. Immediately “Callantsoog” and “Reiger”
came to the rescue of their commander, destroyed the rigging of the
English ship with chain shot and boarded it. Berkeley challenged the
Dutch sea soldiers, shouting:You dogs, you rogues, have you the
heart, so press on board! but was fatally wounded in the throat by
a musket ball. In the powder room the constable was found with his
throat cut; he had tried to blow up the ship but his own crew killed
him first and drenched the powder, claiming afterwards the man had cut
his own throat from pure frustration. HMS “Seven Oaks” (the
former “Sevenwolden”) and HMS “Loyal George” tried
to assist the “Swiftsure” but this only resulted in the
capture of all three ships. The embalmed body of Berkeley was later
returned to England under a truce, accompanied by a letter of the States-General praising the Admiral for his
courage. HMS “Rainbow” got isolated and fled to neutral Ostend,
chased by twelve ships from Tromp's squadron.
Both
fleets bombarded each other in a line of battle. The “Hof van
Zeeland” and the “Duivenvoorde” were hit by fire shot
and burnt. The Dutch didn't know of the existence of this type of
ammunition, consisting of hollow brass balls filled with an
inflammable substance, so they were greatly surprised. Luckily for
them the British had only a small supply because of the high cost of
production.
Monck
retreated for the night, but the ship of Rear-Admiral Harman, HMS
“Henry”, drifted to the Dutch lines and was set aflame by a fireship.
The parson asked Harman what could save them; when the latter
sarcastically replied that the good parson could always jump overboard,
to his horror the panicked clergyman at once followed his advice
together with a third of the crew. All drowned. Evertsen now closed in
and inquired whether Harman would perhaps like to surrender; it came
as no surprise to him the renowned fighter respectfully declined.
Despite repeated Dutch attacks the fire was put out and the “Henry”
escaped, with its last shot shooting Evertsen in two. This first day
was an unmitigated disaster for the British who were outgunned by the
superior gunnery of the Dutch, and outmanśuvred by the superior
tactics of de Ruyter whose fleet seemed almost tgwice the size of its
actual numbers and appeared where least expected.
Second Day
On
the morning of the second day Monck decided to try to destroy the
Dutch by a direct attack and sailed to them from the southwest; but De
Ruyter crossed his line sailing to the southeast, heavily damaging the
British fleet and gaining the weather
gauge. HMS “Anne”, HMS “Bristol” and HMS
“Baltimore” had to return to the Thames. After a calm used for
repairs he turned to attack the British from the south. Just when he
approached the enemy line he noticed to his dismay that the rear
squadron under Tromp had got separated and now was positioned to the
other side of the British line, busy at giving the Dutch rear its
belly full. Often this is explained by assuming Tromp hadn't followed
orders, but although he is indeed infamous for his usual
insubordination, this time he simply hadn't seen the sign flags and
the look-out of the centre mistakenly reported a confirmation sign. De
Ruyter then broke through the enemy line, secured all rear squadron
ships except the burnt “Liefde” and the sinking “Spieghel”
on which Vice-Admiral Abraham van der Hulst had just been killed
and returned to his main force by again breaking through, noticing
smugly that the second time the British ships at once fled
ignominiously.
Tromp,
switching to his fourth ship already, then visited De Ruyter to thank
him for the rescue. Both men were in a dark mood. Rear-Admiral
Frederick Stachouwer had also been killed. The previous day the
damaged “Hollandia” had been sent home together with the
“Gelderland”, “Delft”, “Reiger”, “Asperen”
and “Beschermer” to
guard the three captured English vessels; now also the damaged “Pacificatie”,
“Vrijheid”, “Provincie Utrecht” and “Calantsoog”
had to return and only a handful of the rear squadron remained.
Besides, the enemy had again gained the weather gauge, the dangers of
which became immediately clear as George
Ayscue, seeing the two Admirals together in a vulnerable
position, tried to isolate them; with great difficulty they managed to
return to their main force.
Both
fleets now passed three times in opposite tack; on the second pass “De
Zeven Provinciën” got
damaged and De Ruyter retreated from the fight to repair his ship.
Later some historians would accuse him of cowardice, but he had strict
detailed written orders from the States-General to act exactly so, to
prevent a repeat of the events of the Battle of Lowestoft when the
loss of the supreme commander had wrecked the Dutch command structure.
Vice-Admiral Aert van Nes led the third
pass.
As the Dutch were in a leeward position their guns had a
superior range and some British ships now took dreadful damage. HMS
“Loyal Subject” turned for the home port and had to be
written off on arrival. HMS “Black Eagle” (the former “Groningen”)
raised the distress flag but simply disintegrated before any ships
could assist.
Then, at three in the afternoon, a Dutch flotilla of twelve
ships appeared on the horizon. Monck was shocked, not because the
event was totally unexpected but because his worst fear seemed to come
true. The British had learned from their intelligence network that the
Dutch planned to keep a strong fourth squadron behind as a tactical
reserve. Surely these new ships must be the avantguard of a fresh
force. Monck ordered to check for the number of operational British
ships. When only 29 ships reported to have any fight left in them, and
Rupert was still nowhere to be seen, he decided to withdraw. In fact
De Ruyter had just before the battle convinced the others to use only
three squadrons. Monck had never noticed that the “Rainbow”
had disappeared - indeed he couldn't understand where Berkeley had
gone either. The dozen ships were those of Tromps squadron giving
chase and now rejoining the fight after the intended prey had escaped
to Ostend. The entire British fleet tacked to the southwest at four.
The straggling “St Paul” (the former “Sint Paulus”)
was captured in the evening. The English intelligence network was
generally criticised for failing to warn the British commanders of the
superb gunnery and manśuvering discipline that de Ruyter had
instilled in his fleet.
Third Day
On the third day the English continued to retreat to the west.
The Dutch advanced on a broad front, Van Nes stil in command, both to
catch any more stragglers and to avoid the enormous 32-pounder stern
cannons of the big British ships. In the evening Rupert, having
already on the first day been ordered to join Monck, at last appeared
with twenty ships. He had been unable to reach Monck earlier because
he had sailed as far as the Isle of Wight
in search of the imaginary French fleet. Monck ordered his fleet to
set a straight course for the green squadron despite warnings that
this would take them over the infamous Galloper Shoal at low tide. HMS “Royal Charles” and HMS “Royal Katherine” indeed were
grounded but managed to get free in time, HMS “Prince Royal” got stuck however.
Vice-Admiral George Ayscue, commander of the white squadron,
pleaded with his men to stay calm until flood would lift the ship; but
when two fire ships approached the crew panicked. A certain Lambeth
struck the flag and Ayscue had to surrender to Tromp on the “Gouda”,
the first and last time in history a British admiral of so high a rank
would be captured at sea. De Ruyter had clear orders to destroy any
prise; as the English fleet was still close he couldn't disobey in the
matter of such a capital vessel and ordered the “Prince” burnt.
Tromp didn't dare to make any objections because he had already sent
home some prizes against orders; but later he would freely express his
discontent, in 1681
still trying to get compensation from the admiralty of Amsterdam for
this perceived wrong.
Van Nes now tried to prevent both British fleets from joining.
But when they both sailed behind the back of his blocking squadron, De
Ruyter took over operational command and ordered to wait. This way he
regained the weather gauge.
Fourth Day
Thus enforced Monck again attacked in line on the fourth day.
But the Dutch, now to the southwest of him, had the weather
gauge and attacked themselves aggressively. De Ruyter had
tried to impress on his flag officers that the fight of that day would
be decisive for the entire war. The English attack, vulnerable from a
leeward position, failed to take advantage of the greater reach of
their guns because of the Dutch’ rapid approach, faltered, and their
line was broken in two places. Myngs was fatally wounded in the
shoulder by a musket ball, dying on his return to London. The English
regrouped trying to break free to the south by executing four passes
in opposite tack, but Tromp and Van Nes surrounded them. Monck then
wore to the north. Tromp's squadron was routed, the “Landman” burnt
by a fireship. Van Nes withdrew. De Ruyter, more anxious than at any
other moment in the battle and fearing the fight lost, sailed past
Rupert to attack Monck from behind. When Rupert tried to do the same
to him, The superior gunnery of the Dutch paid off, and three shots in
quick succession dismasted his HMS “Royal James” and the entire
squadron of the green withdrew from the battle to the south,
protecting and towing the flagship. Nothing now prevented De Ruyter
from attacking Monck and the British main force was routed. Many
British ships had no powder left, while the Dutch ships still had a
sufficient supply, as they had a relatively larger cargo room, smaller
guns and a less well-trained gunners. Four stragglers were boarded and
captured by the Dutch: HMS “Clove” “Tree” (the
former VOC-ship
“Nagelboom”), HMS “Convertine” and HMS
“Essex”; the latter got entangled with HMS “Black
Bul”l who was sunk. De Ruyter seeing the British fleet escape in
a dense fog decided to break off the pursuit. His own fleet was
heavily damaged too; his logbook only speaks of a fear for the English
shoals. The deeply religious De Ruyter interpreted the sudden
unseasonly fog bank as a sign of God, showing "that He merely
wanted the enemy humbled for his pride but preserved from utter
destruction".
Results
It was the biggest sea battle of the Second
Anglo-Dutch War. However, the outcome is often
described as inconclusive, because both sides initially claimed
victory. Immediately after the battle some English captains claimed De
Ruyter had retreated first, then normally seen as an acknowledgement
of the superiority of the enemy fleet. Though the Dutch fleet was
eventually forced to end the pursuit, they had managed to cripple the
English fleet, and lost but four ships themselves, for the “Spieghe”l
refused to sink and was repaired. The contemporaneous Dutch view on
this matter is expressed in a famous epigram
by the poet Constantijn Huygens:
Two fight - and
for their lives.
The one that
caused the row
is beaten - but
survives.
And boasts: "I've
won it now!"
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A letter to Charles
II by
Prince Rupert, and the
Duke of Albemarle,
describing the
Four-Days Battle. |
Two months later the recuperated English fleet challenged the
Dutch fleet again, now much more successfully in the St.
James's Day Battle. (Tweedaagse
Zeeslag) Though this proved to be a victory, the
Dutch fleet again wasn't destroyed and the enormous costs of repair
after the previous battle had depleted the British treasury, so the
Four Days Battle is usually seen as a decisive strategic victory for
the Dutch.
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